Eye movements reveal the time-course of anticipating behavior based on complex, conflicting desires by Ferguson, Heather J. & Breheny, Richard
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Ferguson, Heather J. and Breheny, Richard  (2011) Eye movements reveal the time-course of


























 University Of Kent, England, UK  
2







Heather Ferguson   
School of Psychology  
Keynes College  
University of Kent  
Canterbury  
Kent CT2 7NP   
England, UK 
 
email:  h.ferguson@kent.ac.uk  
Tel: +44 (0) 1227 827120  Fax: +44 (0) 1227 827030 
 
 




This work was carried out with the support of a grant to Richard Breheny from the Arts and 
Humanities Research Council (Ref: AH/E002358/1) and the Centre for the Study of Mind in 
Nature (Oslo), ÔLinguistic AgencyÕ project.  Thanks are due to Ruth Filik, Gerry Altmann 
and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on this work.  
Eye movements reveal the time-course of anticipating behaviour 
3 
 
Eye movements reveal the time-course of anticipating behaviour based on complex, 
conflicting desires 
Abstract 
The time-course of representing othersÕ perspectives is inconclusive across the currently 
available models of ToM processing. We report two visual-world studies investigating how 
knowledge about a characterÕs basic preferences (e.g. TomÕs favourite colour is pink) and 
higher-order desires (his wish to keep this preference secret) compete to influence online 
expectations about subsequent behaviour. ParticipantsÕ eye movements around a visual scene 
were tracked while they listened to auditory narratives. While clear differences in 
anticipatory visual biases emerged between conditions in Experiment 1, post-hoc analyses 
testing the strength of the relevant biases suggested a discrepancy in the time-course of 
predicting appropriate referents within the different contexts. Specifically, predictions to the 
target emerged very early when there was no conflict between the characterÕs basic 
preferences and higher-order desires, but appeared to be relatively delayed when 
comprehenders were provided with conflicting information about that characterÕs desire to 
keep a secret. However, a second experiment demonstrated that this apparent Ôcognitive costÕ 
in inferring behaviour based on higher-order desires was in fact driven by low-level features 
between the context sentence and visual scene. Taken together, these results suggest that 
healthy adults are able to make complex higher-order ToM inferences without the need to call 
on costly cognitive processes. Results are discussed relative to previous accounts of ToM and 
language processing. 
 
Keywords: Theory of Mind, eye movements, visual world paradigm, discourse processing 
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Theory of mind (ToM) is a commonly used term to describe the ability to understand and 
predict events in terms of other peoplesÕ mental states, such as their intentions, beliefs and 
desires. As such, it is not just an everyday task, but an every-time-we-encounter-another-
person task. So it is something that as adults we perform frequently and, with the well- 
documented exceptions of disorders such as autism and schizophrenia (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 
2000; Frith & Corcoran, 1996), seemingly also without a great deal of difficulty. However, a 
long tradition of research suggests that ToM reasoning incurs a certain degree of difficulty. 
Research on childrenÕs development of ToM abilities strongly suggests that children only 
develop fully functioning ToM abilities, sufficient to pass false-belief tasks, for instance, in 
their fourth or fifth year (Wellman, Cross & Watson, 2001). Research with adults also 
suggests that, at least on certain tasks or in certain domains, ToM inferences are not 
automatic (e.g. Apperly, Riggs, Simpson, Samson, & Chiavarino, 2006) or as well integrated 
with other inferences as one might otherwise expect (e.g. Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Brauner, 
2000; Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003). Indeed even among these healthy adults, ToM 
performance has been related to Executive Function abilities, with recent research 
demonstrating correlations between ToM abilities and inhibitory control (Brown-Schmidt, 
2009b; German & Hehman, 2006) and working memory capacity (Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 
2010; McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007). 
Taken together, this research supports the view that those aspects of ToM involving 
higher-order inferences about mental states are set apart from more basic inferences about 
goals based on situational constraints (Perner, 1991; Tomasello & Rakoczy, 2003). On this 
view, higher-order ToM reasoning draws on resource consuming controlled processes. Many 
challenges to this view exist, however. On the one hand, infants as young as 18 months seem 
to be able to pass non-verbal false-belief tasks (Onishi & Baillargeon; 2005; Southgate, 
Senju, & Csibra, 2007), while it has been argued that older toddlersÕ difficulty with verbal 
Eye movements reveal the time-course of anticipating behaviour 
5 
 
false-belief tasks engages aspects of the task not germane to ToM inference (Bloom & 
German, 2000; Friedman & Leslie, 2004, Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010). In the domain of 
adult online processing, the view that perspective taking in discourse does not occur in first-
pass processing has been challenged (e.g. Brown-Schmidt, Gunlogson, & Tanenhaus, 2008; 
Hanna, Tanenhaus, & Trueswell, 2003; Heller, Grodner, & Tananhaus, 2008), as has the view 
that ToM inferences are not automatic (Cohen & German, 2009). In this paper we will 
address these issues by examining the timecourse with which adults are able to make 
appropriate ToM inferences about a characterÕs behaviour, and by considering whether 
conflicts between that characterÕs basic preferences and higher-order desires necessarily 
demand increased cognitive effort.  
To date, various approaches have been used to investigate ToM reasoning in adults, 
with many of these tasks adapting a version of the false belief paradigm (Baron-Cohen, 
Leslie, & Frith, 1985). In this task, participants hear a short story that involves the transfer of 
a target object either with or without the knowledge of a specified character (thus establishing 
a basis for false belief in some conditions). Success on this task is typically measured through 
participantsÕ responses to questions that require an inference about the characterÕs false belief 
(Òwhere will X look for the Y?Ó). Clearly then this task can provide valuable information on 
the developmental Ôtransitional phaseÕ of ToM ability (e.g. de Villiers & Pyers, 2002; Flavell, 
Flavell, Green, & Moses, 1990; Wellman, Cross & Watson, 2001). However, since adults do 
not normally make errors on this task, its application to adult populations is more limited 
(Stone, Baron-Cohen & Knight, 1998; Perner & Wimmer, 1985). Over the last decade, 
attempts to make the task more complicated for adults by, for example, including multiple 
embeddings (as in, ÔLauren thinks that Tara knows that Alison ate the cheeseÕ; Kinderman, 
Dunbar & Bentall, 1998; Rutherford, 2004), or increasing cognitive demands (e.g., with a 
concurrent memory task; Mckinnon & Moscovitch, 2007) have revealed a disruption in 
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processing when making inferences about mental states. However, a more precise indicator of 
ability in such a task has been gained from recent studies that have measured both accuracy 
of responses and reaction times (e.g. Apperly, Back, Samson & France, 2008; German & 
Hehman, 2006). Generally, these studies suggest that inferring false beliefs engage more 
effortful cognitive processes relative to other inferences, as reflected in slower judgments 
relating to both reality and beliefs. For example, Apperly, Riggs, Simpson, Chiavarino and 
Samson (2006) found increased response times to belief compared to reality probe questions 
following a false belief video when participants were not explicitly instructed to track the 
personÕs beliefs.  
While reaction time methods such as these have provided valuable insights into the 
relative availability of reality and belief concepts, they remain limited as to the detail they can 
provide relating to the exact time course of ToM inferences during language processing or in 
general. To address this issue, researchers have begun to investigate how inferences about 
othersÕ knowledge evolve over time during social interaction using the visual world paradigm 
(Cooper, 1974; Tanenhaus, Spivey, Eberhard & Sedivy, 1975). These studies have used eye 
tracking to monitor listenersÕ eye movements while they interpret a speakerÕs utterances and 
manipulate objects in a visual scene. Importantly, some of the visual objects are occluded 
from the speakerÕs but not the listenerÕs view, thus creating a disparity between the set of 
information in the common ground (see Clark, 1996; Stalnaker, 1978) versus privileged 
ground. Generally, these studies agree that the addressees have rapid access to common 
ground information, allowing them to restrict referential candidates to those in common 
ground; however, inconsistencies arise regarding timing of such referential biases. 
One view, typically referred to as the egocentric account, suggests a dissociation 
between peoplesÕ ability to reflect on information from their own versus other peoplesÕ 
knowledge and the routine ability to apply it in social situations (e.g. Barr & Keysar, 2002; 
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Epley, Morewedge & Keysar, 2004; Keysar, & Barr, 2005; Keyser et al., 2000; Keysar et al., 
2003). In an example of one such study, Keysar et al. (2003) set up communication scenarios 
where listeners first hid a Ôprivate competitorÕ object (e.g. a roll of sellotape) in an opaque 
brown bag and placed it alongside other items that were mutually visible to both of them, 
including a Ôcommon-ground competitorÕ object (e.g. a cassette tape). Test trials then 
involved the speaker asking the listener to Òmove the tapeÓ and compared trials where the 
target and competitor matched with those where they mismatched. Results showed that on 
critical trials, listeners continued to consider the private competitor as a possible referent, 
despite their knowledge of the speakersÕ ignorance about the object that is in the bag. Indeed, 
many listeners even attempted to move the bag itself at some point during the experiment. 
Experiments such as this suggest that comprehension is initially biased to the comprehendersÕ 
own knowledge rather than to the speakerÕs (often partially ignorant) perspective (a 
phenomenon clearly related to the Òcurse of knowledgeÓ, e.g. Birch & Bloom, 2007). This 
would predict that integration of other peoplesÕ perspectives operates only as a subsequent 
and controlled correction mechanism that requires increased cognitive effort.  
An alternative to the egocentric view suggests that addressees show a strong and early 
preference for potential referents in common ground. Hanna et al. (2003) argue that certain 
aspects of previous perspective-taking studies were detrimental to the process of integrating 
perspective into interpretation, such as the use of a recording in Keysar et al. (2000) or the 
absence of grounding referents in common ground. Hanna et al. (2003) attempted to remedy 
these perceived shortcomings and subsequently showed that participants were much more 
sensitive to the speakerÕs perspective, virtually without delay. However, even in these studies 
there is some small interference from the privileged ground competitor. Similar results are 
reported in Heller et al. (2008), which eliminates a global ambiguity present in the Hanna et 
al. studies that may have encouraged participants to overcome any Ôstrategic egocentrismÕ 
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bias. Still better evidence that perspective can be integrated immediately comes from Brown-
Schmidt et al. (2008) who use a different type of discourse to previous studies. In Keysar et 
al. (2000) and most other perspective research, the speaker gives orders to a participant. In 
Brown-Schmidt et alÕs study, the speaker and hearer are engaged in a joint action and the 
critical sentences are questions. 
The authors of these studies propose that perspective-taking in discourse can be 
explained within the Constraint-Based framework, according to which cues to mismatched 
perspective are treated with greater or lesser degrees of certainty and so perspective 
information is incorporated only where these cues overcome the very strong constraints 
provided by the form of the speakerÕs referring expression.  Constraint-Based models of 
comprehension are automatic, interactive and frequency-based (see MacDonald & 
Seidenberg, 2006) and so the account offered in Hanna et al. (2003), Heller et al. (2008) and 
Brown-Schmidt et al. (2008; see also Brown-Schmidt, 2009b; Nadig & Sedivy, 2002) is 
compatible with the idea that some, common higher-order ToM tasks, involving multiple 
perspectives, do not make great processing demands, in terms of EF or other mechanisms of 
controlled processing.  
Taken together, the eye-tracking literature on speakerÕs perspective provides very 
informative evidence relevant to our question and highlights the benefits of using online 
techniques, such as the visual world paradigm, to examine the incremental processes involved 
in language comprehension. However, thus far this work has focused on one particular case 
of higher-order ToM inference that involves an ambiguous noun or expression and appears to 
suffer from a strong Ôbottom upÕ effect from the language input (Barr, 2008). Additionally, 
studies of this kind always involve the participant holding a different, more informed, 
perspective than the speaker (see also Gerrig, Brennan & Ohaeri, 2000; Gerrig, Ohaeri & 
Brennan, 2000; Keysar, 1994; 2000). As we are interested in the general question of whether 
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higher-order ToM inferences necessarily engage effortful EF processes we can look beyond 
these tasks which require participants to overcome a Ôcurse of knowledgeÕ, something which 
is well known to provide much interference in ToM processing (see Birch & Bloom, 2007).  
Recently, Ferguson, Scheepers and Sanford (2010) have examined the processing of 
stories that involve a false belief using the visual world paradigm. Here, participants heard a 
ÔrealityÕ (e.g. ÒJohn watched Mary move the...Ó) or ÔbeliefÕ (e.g. ÒWhile John was distracted, 
Mary moved the...Ó) context, followed by a target sentence describing the characterÕs looking 
behaviour (e.g. Later John wanted to find his watch so he looked on theÉÕ) that was paired 
with visually presented location-referents. Results showed that comprehenders were able to 
modify expectations based on their own knowledge about reality, to direct their visual 
attention to appropriate referents according that characterÕs perspective. This was evident 
from contextually-driven visual biases that emerged from before the target location onset. 
Critically, these results point towards a language processor that is immediately able to use 
relevant information about the beliefs of others to predict their subsequent actions, without 
interference from narrative reality. In Ferguson et al.Õs study of online belief reasoning, there 
was no evidence of disrupted processing when comparing false belief and true belief 
conditions. However, it is possible that this was due to the inclusion of anomalous 
continuations (i.e. on half the trials the characterÕs behaviour conflicted with their beliefs), 
which may have prompted comprehenders to process all incoming information more deeply. 
To follow on from this work we have designed a new paradigm using scenarios that tap into 
reasoning about othersÕ behaviour without conflicting knowledge from the self-perspective. 
There are many discourse contexts that call on the use of higher-order ToM abilities 
and involve conflicting perspectives but where the curse of knowledge is not an issue. For 
example, a character in a story may have conflicting desires or mixed emotions. One familiar 
source of conflicting desires involves conflict over private basic desires, which can result in 
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embarrassing or socially less acceptable behaviour and a desire to conform or be accepted in 
the eyes of others. For instance, a character may have a love of junk food but is embarrassed 
about this and does not want other people to know about it. Making a prediction about such a 
characterÕs public behaviour requires taking into account different possible intentions (or 
courses of action) which conflict with one another and it requires judging whether other 
peopleÕs attitude to the characterÕs truly desired action will affect that characterÕs behaviour. 
Although any prediction about such a characterÕs actions clearly involves a higher-order 
theory of mind inference and also a comparison of conflicting mental states, there is no 
interference from information in the discourse situation (such as Ôpull of realityÕ or effects of 
linguistic input) that is found in the online studies discussed above. Additionally, such a 
Ôsecret desireÕ scenario should be familiar to most of us and should not pose too much 
difficulty due to its novelty.  
A similarly complex scenario, in terms of ToM inference, is one where a character has 
a great love of junk food but is very happy for people to know about that. Here a characterÕs 
public actions will be based both on basic preferences and higher-order intentions with 
regards to the attitude of others, but unlike the ÔsecretÕ scenario, the basic-level preference 
and the higher-order intentions do not result in conflicting possible courses of action. Like the 
secret scenario, characters that hold such ÔopenÕ attitudes should also be familiar to most of 
us.  
In the current experiments, participants listened to short stories made up of two 
sentences. The first sentence introduced a property of a character (e.g. a personal preference) 
and set up a context in which that character was either happy about other people knowing 
about the property (basic preferences and intentions were consistent, as in (1a)) or where the 
character did not want people to know about the property (basic preferences and intentions 
were in direct conflict, as in (1b)).  




(1) a.   Elaine is very open about her love of junk food.  
b. Elaine is very self-conscious about her love of junk food.  
 
The second sentence (2) elaborated on this by describing the story character performing some 
action that was consistent with the preceding context (so itÕs appropriate for Elaine to eat a 
burger within (1a), but something other than junk food, i.e. a salad, within (1b)), while 
participants viewed a visual scene containing images that matched the characterÕs action. 
Note that within both conditions, the relevant action is predictable given the background 
information provided in (1). However, both conditions involve fairly sophisticated ToM 
reasoning, as characters make choices based not only on their basic preferences but also on 
how they wish to be seen in the eyes of others. Additionally, in the ÔsecretÕ condition (1b), 
there is a conflict between a choice of action based on the salient basic preference (ElaineÕs 
love of junk food) and the equally salient intention to keep this preference secret from other 
people. Thus, although the reasoning from the background information in (1) to a prediction 
about the choice in (2) is equally sophisticated for both conditions, there appears to be an 
additional hurdle to overcome in the secret condition in ignoring potential predictions based 
on the characterÕs salient basic preference. 
 
(2) a.   Earlier, Elaine ate lunch in public and she intentionally chose to eat a burger.  
b.   Earlier, Elaine ate lunch in public and she intentionally chose to eat a salad. 
 
As suggested above, with this design a fully warranted prediction in both cases would 
involve taking into account the characterÕs intentions with respect to other people in addition 
to basic preferences. Specifically, it would involve making inferences about the perspective 
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of other people if the simple preference is acted upon. This step applies to both cases, but is 
of particular interest in the secret condition since a correct prediction cannot be made without 
making both inferences. In contrast, information about basic preferences and intentions in the 
ÔopenÕ condition (1a) both point to the same target- so it is possible to correctly predict the 
appropriate referent without deriving the full warrant from the context. 
Therefore, if comprehenders have established a representation of the characterÕs 
perspective based on contextual information about their basic preferences and higher-order 
intentions, then different anticipatory biases should become apparent within each of these 
contexts, regardless of the matched information about the characterÕs basic preferences. 
Specifically, we reasoned that such anticipation should emerge from the point at which 
comprehenders learn about the characterÕs overall goal or activity (e.g. eating lunch). Thus, 
we would expect proficient theory of mind reasonersÕ visual biases to reflect this prediction 
some time before the offset of the disambiguating word (ÒburgerÓ/ ÒsaladÓ).   
However, if higher-order inferences about othersÕ minds are more difficult to set up 
(as suggested by Apperly et al., 2008), we would expect to see a delay in generating 
expectations. Additionally, if inferences that involve conflicting mental states necessarily 
involve the operation of costly executive mechanisms, then we should expect to see a 
difference to emerge between the ÔopenÕ condition and the ÔsecretÕ condition, as only the 
latter involves inferences about conflicting intentions. We will examine the time-course of 
such anticipation with the aim of drawing conclusions as to whether increased cognitive 
effort, as reflected by the time required to set up expectations, is needed to generate 
inferences when they are based on contextually available information about the characterÕs 
intentions to keep basic preferences a secret compared to the characterÕs intention to openly 
act according to those basic preferences.  
 






Thirty participants (15 female) from University College London were paid to take part in the 
study. All were native English speakers with normal or corrected to normal vision and had no 
prior exposure to the experimental items. 
 
Stimuli and Design 
Sixteen experimental pictures were paired with auditory passages in one of two conditions. 
Table 1 and Figure 1 provide an example of such experimental sentences and the associated 
visual displays. Visual displays were created using commercially available clip art collections 
and were presented on a 17 inch colour monitor running at 85 Hz refresh rate in 1024 x 768 
pixels resolution. Each scene contained four images: Character, Open Referent (pink car), 
Secret Referent (green car), and a Distracter (weights), which was neither open- nor secret- 
congruent. To prevent any systematic viewing strategies, spatial arrangements of these four 
picture elements differed across items. Sound files consisted of two sentences. Sentence one 
introduced a fact about the story character (e.g. TomÕs favourite colour is pink) within either 
an open or secret context (ÒTom is always telling people thatÉÓ versus ÒTom doesnÕt want 
anyone to know thatÉÓ). Sentence two then described an event (e.g. buying a new car) that 
drew reference to an open- or secret- relevant referent (ÒÉhe deliberately chose a pink versus 
green carÓ), resulting in a 1-factor within subjects design. The position of the critical word 
always occurred roughly mid-sentence.  
One version of each item was assigned to one of two presentation lists, with each list 
containing sixteen experimental items, eight in each of the two conditions, blocked to ensure 
that they were evenly distributed. In addition, twenty-four unrelated filler items were added 





. They all consisted of correctly matched picture-sentence pairings and were 
interspersed randomly among the sixteen experimental trials to create a single random order. 
These filler items required the participant to make linguistic inferences (e.g. ÒIf mosquitoes 
thrived in dry climates, they would quickly find a suitable habitat. Mosquitoes would be in 
abundance in certain locations and frustrate all the local residents.Ó), but importantly they did 
not involve ToM reasoning, surprising events or unexpected endings. Each subject only saw 
each target sentence once, in one of the two conditions. At least one filler trial intervened 
between any two experimental trials.  
 
Table 1:  
Examples of experimental sentences (Experiment 1). 
 
 
Figure 1:  
Example visual stimulus used in Experiments 1 and 2. Participants heard the target sentence 
(see above) whilst viewing this picture 
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 Please contact the first author for a full list of filler items. 






 Sentences were recorded in one session from a female native British English speaker 
who was instructed to use a neutral intonation. The auditory files were presented as 44.1 KHz 
mono sound clips via headphones connected to the eye-tracker PC. The temporal onsets of 
critical words were hand-coded with millisecond resolution using the GoldWave sound-
editing package. 
Comprehension questions, relating to either the auditory or visual input, followed half 
of the experimental and half of the filler trials. Participants did not receive feedback for their 
responses to these questions. Only participants scoring at or above 80% accuracy on the 
comprehension questions were used in the data analysis. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were seated in front of a 17 inch colour monitor with integrated eye tracking 
system (Tobii 1750) running at 50 Hz sampling rate. Viewing was binocular and eye 
movements were recorded from both eyes simultaneously. Participants were given the 
following instruction: ÒIn this experiment you will hear short spoken passages and during the 
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second sentence a picture will also be displayed. We are interested in how the pictures help 
you understand the spoken passagesÓ. 
 The experiment was controlled using e-Prime (Schneider, Eschmann, & Zuccolotto, 
2002). As illustrated in Figure 2, each trial began with the presentation of a single centrally-
located cross and participants were asked to fixate it for 1500msec before the trial was 
automatically initiated. The fixation cross remained on screen while participants heard 
Sentence 1 (open or secret context, no picture presentation). They were asked to continue 
looking at the fixation cross during this time. Then a 100ms blank screen was presented, 
followed by the target picture combined with Sentence 2. The onset of the target picture 
preceded the onset of the corresponding spoken sentence by 1000ms. The picture stayed on 
the screen for nine seconds, and the corresponding sentence typically ended 1-2 seconds 
before the end of the trial.  
 
Figure 2:  
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At the beginning of the experiment, and once every ten trials thereafter, the eye-
tracker was calibrated against nine fixation points. This procedure took about half a minute 
and an entire session lasted for about half an hour. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Data Processing 
Eye movements that were initiated during Sentence 2 were processed according to the 
relevant picture and sound onsets for the purpose of aggregating the location and duration of 
each 50Hz (i.e. 20ms) sample from the eye tracker. For analysis, any sample that was deemed 
ÔinvalidÕ due to blinks or head movements was removed from the data. The spatial 
coordinates of the eye movement samples (in pixels) were then mapped onto the appropriate 
object regions using colour-coded bitmap templates; if a fixation was located within 20 pixels 
around an objectÕs perimeter, it was coded as belonging to that object, otherwise, it was 
coded as background. All consecutive samples within one object region before the eyes 
moved to a different region were pooled into a single gaze. Finally, temporal onsets and 
offsets of the gazes were recalculated relative to the corresponding picture onset by 
subtracting the picture onset from the relative gaze onsets and offsets. 
Probabilities of gazes to the critical open and secret referents as a function of time 
were analysed as described by Arai, van Gompel & Scheepers (2007), using the following 
log-ratio measure: 
 
(Eq. 1)    log(Open/Secret) = ln(P(Open) / P(Secret)),  
 
where P(Open) refers to the probability of gazes on the open referent (pink car) and P(Secret) to 
the probability of gazes on the secret referent (green car); ln refers to the natural logarithm. 
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The output is therefore symmetrical around zero such that a positive score reflects higher 
proportions of gazes on the open referent and a negative score reflects higher proportions of 





Preview Region Analyses 
In order to examine very early anticipatory effects prior to language input, we analysed 
distributions of fixations during the picture preview. Recall that the onset of the picture 
preceded the onset of the corresponding target sentence by 1000ms. So, for each condition, 
we calculated the average log(Open/Secret) scores for each condition from 500ms to 1000ms 
post-picture onset (prior to that time period, participants were likely to fixate the area around 
the previously presented fixation cross, meaning insufficient numbers of observations for log-
ratio analyses). The data were synchronized on a by-trial basis, relative to 500ms post- 
picture onset in the appropriate item-condition combination. Figure 3 shows the relevant 
descriptive data. Inferential analyses revealed no significant difference between conditions 
[all Fs < 1.3], and therefore indicate that context does not influence the distribution of looks 
between the two target referents prior to language input. Follow-up t-tests comparing the 
dependent measure to chance revealed an early preview-bias to the open referent for both 
secret (t1(29) = 3.61, p < 0.001; t2(15) = 2.95, p < 0.01) and open (t1(29) = 5.66, p < 0.001; 
t2(15) = 2.99, p < 0.01) conditions. 
 
Figure 3: 
The average log(Open/Secret) scores for each condition during the Preview in Experiment 1.  
 
                                                
2
 Separate analyses of the proportions of gazes on the Character and Distracter referents revealed no significant 
cross-condition effects whatsoever (contact authors for a graphical representation of these data). 





































 These results show that prior to linguistic input, participantsÕ visual biases do not 
initially differ following open and secret contexts. Further, they show an initial visual 
preference for the open referent (pink car) over the secret referent (green car), which is likely 
to reflect the fact that the open referent was explicitly mentioned within both contexts.  
 
Main Analyses 
For the main analyses, we were interested in whether contextual information about a 
characterÕs intention to keep a secret (open vs. secret) affected proportions of gazes on the 
open referent (the pink car in Figure 1) relative to the secret referent (the green car in Figure 
1), specifically in time periods preceding the onset of the disambiguating word (ÒpinkÓ or 
ÒgreenÓ). Thus, we analysed a time period ranging from the auditory onset of the target 
sentence (e.g. ÒLast weekÉÓ), until the offset of the disambiguating target noun (ÒpinkÓ or 
ÒgreenÓ, respectively). Here, the data were synchronized on a by-trial basis, relative to the 
actual onsets and offsets of relevant words in the appropriate item-condition combination. 
Figure 4 plots the observed average log(Open/Secret) data in each condition, for every 20 ms 
time-slot within the selected time period. Note that eye movements and auditory input have 
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been resynchronized according to the onset of critical regions (see Altmann & Kamide, 
2009), and as such represent more accurate plots of evolving visual biases around the scene. 
Thus, the dashed vertical lines in Figure 3 indicate the absolute onsets and average offsets of 
words in the target sentence, as labelled.  
 
